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THREE recent biographies of Benjamin Franklin Butler are
entitled Stormy Ben Butler; Ben Butler, The South Called
Him Beast!; and simply UBeast" Butler. 1 The appearance of
these volumes demonstrates the continuation of the interest and
controversy which have always been associated with Butler's
name. They also indicate that while the general has his defenders some parts of the North as well as the South still call
him "Beast." Popular history must have its villains as well as
its heroes, and tradition has now firmly established Benjamin
Butler in the former role. He is perhaps most widely known
as an incompetent general who mistreated the citizens of New
Orleans and came home from the war with pockets stuffed full
of graft and stolen spoons.
This of course represents th~ element of caricature with
which legend envelops historical figures, but the sober judgment
of some trained historians has scarcely been less severe. James
Ford Rhodes stated that General Butler "was a man without
capacity and without character."2 Most of the standard histories have pictured Butler in an unfavorable light, but in his
own lifetime his friends and defenders included some of the
most eminent men of the day. During the Civil War he was
repeatedly given important assignments, and in peace time the
voters continued to elect him to office. It can of course be
maintained that voters and governments often go badly astray
1 Robert S. Holtzman, Stormy Ben Butler (New York, 1954) ; Hans L. Trefousse, Ben Butler-The South Called Him BEAST I (New Haven, 1957) ;
Robert Werlich, "Beast" Butler (Washington, 1962). Holtzman and Trefousse present scholarly and well balanced accounts of Butler's life. Werlich's book is devoted to sensational denunciation of almost every aspect of
the general's career, but lacks documentation or serious evaluation.
2 Testimony before the Committee on State House and Libraries of the
Massachusetts General Court, February 5, 1914, as reported by H. J.
:Morton in a letter to Mrs. Adelbert Ames, July 17, 1915.
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and that Butler's success is merely one more discouraging proof
that crime does pay. Yet there is a reasonable case for Benjamin Butler and some historians have raised serious, doubts
about the charges made against him. It is neither possible nor
desirable to retouch Butler's historical portrait so that the horns
of a dubious popular tradition become an equally improbable
halo.
In 1864 Butler learned that Senator Garrer Davis had offered a resolution for inquiry into his conduct and wrote that
the senator "could do him no greater favor" than to have every
act of his political and military caJ}eer thoroughly scrutinized.
He concluded: "I have no favors to ask and but one: act of
justioe., that the inquisition may not be ex parte, i.e., one· sided."3
Only a full scale biography could hope to deal with every aspect
of a life so filled with controversy, but as far as possible the
present "inquisition" will not be one sided. What will be presented here is an interpretation of Benjamin Butler as a soldier,
politician, and citizen who had his full share of failings but
who, in the words of General Grant, was "a man who has done
to the country great service and who is worthy of its gratitude."4
I

The Soldier

The central and decisive period in the life of Benjamin Butler,
as for most men of his generation, came in the grim, strifefilled years of Civil War. He always regarded his service as
a major general as his principal achievement and devoted the
bulk of his nlemoirs to its defense. Butler's military record
has been savagely attacked by both his contemporaries and
later writers. General W. F. Smith described him as "helpless
as a child on the field of battle and as visionary as an opium
eater in council."5 A recent popular history of the war calls
him "a problem on two legs . . . a classical examp~e of the
bartender politician, with one-eye and that usually bleary, two
3 Jessie Ames Marshall (compiler), The Private and Official Correspondence
6f Gen. Benjamin F. Butler During The Period oJ The Oivil War, 5 vols.,
(Norwood, Mass., 1917), IV, 303.
4 John Russell Young, Around the World with General Grant, 2 vols., (New
York, 1879), II, 304.
5 The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Oonfederate
Armies, 128 vols., (Washington, 1880-1901), XL, Part II, 595. Hereafter
cited as O. R.
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left feet and a genius for getting them into every plate
"6
In contrast to these and many similar denunciations there is
considerable evidence that General Butler's military career was
by no nleans without merit or substantial service to his country.
It was during the first confused and crucial weeks of the
war that Butler made his most decisive contribution to the
Union cause. His role involved little if any real fighting but
did require boldness and imagination. What was more inlportant, it called for a willingness to face the fact that a real and
deadly conflict had begun. In the agonizing days of Apri11861
state after state had left the Union and the border region from
Maryland to Missouri seemed likely to follow. Secessionist
mobs had attacked Massachusetts's troops in Baltimore and
had cut all communications between Washington and the North.
In the isolated capital, Maryland officials warned President Lincoln that any efforts to bring in reinforcements or reopen communications were sure to result in further bloodshed and the
state's secession.
Butler, an influential Massachusetts Democrat, had already
done much to rally his party to the Union by prompt and
vigorous support of the war. Since January he had encouraged
Governor Andrew's efforts to prepare the militia and was able
to secure the command of the Massachusetts forces when Lincoln's call for troops finally arrived. 7 Butler's regiments along
with a contingent from New York were responsible for reopening conlmunications with Washington. Finding the railroad
bridges burned and Baltimore in the hands of a mob the Massachusetts general seized ferryboats and moved his forces to Annapolis, Maryland. Once ashore Butler brushed aside the protests of Maryland's wavering Governor Hicks, dealt firmly with
any signs of hostility by the citizens, and soon repaired a branch
railway connecting with the main line to Washington. Along
this new line of communications troops and supplies were
moved into the capital. The blare of regimental bands and the
tramp of northern regiments soon dissolved the nightmare of a
paralyzed government surrounded by hostile territory. It is
() Fletcher Pratt, .A. ShGrt Hi8tory of the Oivil War (New York, 1956), 45.
7 Speech by General E. F. Jones before New York Loyal Legion, May 3,
1911; l\farshall, I, 6-16; Benjamin F. Butler, Butler's Book, .A. Review oj
His Legal, PoHt'ical, and lIfilitary Oareer, (Boston, 1892), 161-168.
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uncertain whether the plan for a new route to the capital originated with Butler or, as seems more probable, with the railway
officials. There is no doubt, however, that it was the general
who carried it into effect. 8
Baltinlore remained in the hands or Southern sympathizers,
who openly collected arms and nloney for the Confederacy and
blocked the direct route between Washington and Philadelphia.
The aged Gen,eral Scott had only a vague plan for its eventual
recovery. Meanwhile federal reinforcements were meekly detoured around the city. Butler's solution was both more dramatic and more effective. After some colorful spying and deceptive moves the Massachus,etts general suddenly arrived at
the Baltimore railway station with a thousand troops. This
was followed by the first of Butler's bombastic proclamations
and the arrest of the mayor and police commissioners. At
Frederick another detachment of Butler's men seized Ross
Winams, a millionaire secessionist. The legislature was at the
same time warned that it would meet a similar fate if it showed
any signs of passing disloyal resolutions. General Scott was
horrified by this "hazardous occupation of Baltimore" and at
first refused to believe that action had also been taken at Frederick. 9
Butler's critics have treated his seizure of Annapolis and
Baltimore as examples of military incompetence and reckless
interference with the proper conduct of the war. Robert Werlich has even expressed amazement that these actions did not
lead to the secession of Maryland and other border states. tO
These accusations are bas.ed upon the assumption that the
border states could be saved for the Union only through a policy
of extreme caution if not appeasement. This was indeed for a
time the policy of Lincoln and General Scott, but the harsh
realities of war soon demonstrated that the border states were
won or lost largely in terms of energetic action and military
force. Butler was hastily removed to another command but
the administration essentially vindicated mnl by adopting his
policy. Hundreds of Marylanders of dubious loyalty soon
8 Marshall, I, 26, 29-35, 39. 42, 44-49; Butler's Book, 176ff; O. R., Series I.
II, 596-7, 589.
9 Marshall, T, 81-85; O. R., Series I, II 636.
10 Werlich, 18.
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joined the Baltimore officials in prison. Troops continued to
overawe the legislature, and even the wavering Governor Hicks
was elevated to the Senate with the aid of federal bayonets. In
retrospect it is easy to say that Butler's seizures of Annapolis
and Baltimore were obvious moves which involved no fighting
and little danger. The fact remains that he was one of the
few men in the North who was ready to brush aside the largely
fictitious obstacles of states' rights, secessionist mobs, and military red tape, and act vigorously in defense of the Union.
Butler's first "battle" was of such a minor nature that it would
scarcely be worth noting exeept for the manner in which it
has been treated by his detractors. General Scott had removed
his troublesome subordinate to Fortress Monroe where he was
allowed insufficient forces for serious campaigning, but was
authorized to harass enemy forces in his vicinity. Butler dispatched some 5,000 troops to drive away a Confederate battery
which had been established at Big Bethel a few miles from the
fortress. A skirmish took place in which raw troops and faulty
nlanagem,ent by the regular army officers in charge of the expedition caused a pTecipitant retreat by the Union forces. The
victorious Confederates also soon dismantled their battery and
withdrew. Big Bethel was typical of the dozens of skirmishes
with which inexperienced citizen soldiers began the war. The
Union casualties were about 76, of which less than a dozen
were dead. 11 It was, however, the first Northern defeat and
was vastly magnified by the press on both sides. Twenty years
later stump speakers campaigning against Congressman Butler
still spoke of it as if it had been another Fredericksburg or
Bull Run. What is more surprising is to find historians such
as Fletcher Pratt describing the skirmish as Butler's "nlarch
on Richmond" which cost 200 lives. 12 Werlich does even better, or more properly even worse, by making it not only an
"insane" plan to take Richmond and a smashing Union defeat but also a diabolical plot to destroy Butler's subordinate,
General Pierce. 13
o. R., Series I, II, 80-82; Marshall, I. 133-4; Joint Oommittee on the
Oonduct oj the War, 37th Cong., Part III, 281-282.

11

12 Pratt, 45.
13 Werlich, 23-25.
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Between Big Bethel and the JanIes River campaign three
years later Butler conducted several highly important expeditions, which involved little serious fighting. In the amphibious
assaults on Hatteras Inlet and New Orleans he commanded the
troops but the issue was decided by the guns of thie navy. At
Hatteras Inlet the general's notoriously aggressive manner may
well have bluffed the Confederates into surrendering to a Union
fleet which was itself in a precarious position. 14 He showed
considerable strategic sense and initiative in deciding to hold
the captured forts rather than following orders to merely block
up the channel. This decision made Hatteras a nlajor base
for the navy and changed the ,expedition from a raid to a permanent contribution toward an effective blockade. 15 While
in command at New Orleans Butler's troop,s were spread out in
op,erations against small Confederate regular detachments and
nunlerous partisan bands. Only one major engagement was
fought. At Baton Rouge his troops decisively repulsed a Confederate attack. The victory was won with heavy support from
gunboats and Butler was not in actual command of the operation. 16 If the battle had been lost, however, it is more than
likely that it would have joined Big Bethel in the list of Butler's
"smashing defeats."
Until the spring of 1864 Butler's military career was successful but had not involved major field operations. He had
demonstrated remarkable abilities as a nlilitary administrator
and in the seizure of Annapolis, Baltimore, and Hatteras he
had shown initiative and a sound sense of strategy. The James
River Campaign of 1864 not only obscured nluch of this
creditable record but saddled him with the designation of "Bottled Up" Butler. This vivid and euphonious phrase which
originated in General Grant's report not only provided material
for hostile speeches and cartoons but becanle a symbol of
Butler's alleged military incompetence and buffoonery. Along
with the Southern inspired designation of "Beast," Butler was
to be pursued by this bottle image throughout his political
career and on through the pages of endless historical works.
14 Holtzman, 51 ; Marshall. I, 227-35, 238, 258-259, 335.
15 Committee on Conduct of War., 37th Cong., Part III, 282-4.
16 Marshall, II, 155, 172-173; O. R' J Series I, XV, 595.
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The twenty-two thousand men who made up the Army of
the James were Butler's first major command in the field. 11
Their task was to push a diversionary attack toward Richmond
while Grant launched the major offensive against Lee in northern Virginia. Grant instructed Butler to land so'me twelve
miles below the Confederate capital "fortify or rather intrench
at once" and then to push up the south bank of the James
"looking upon Richmond as your objective point." If possible
the Richmond Petersburg railway was to be cut. The lieutenant
general also indicated that the Army of the Potonlac would
under certain conditions move to the James and operate against
Richmond fronl the positions established by Butler's troopS.18
Demonstrating his usual skill in organization Butler shipped
his army up the James on schedule and landed only eight miles
northwest of the vital rail junction of Petersburg and twelve
miles south of the Confederate capital. On May 7, 1864, he
seemed close to the nlilitary fame which he so ardently sought.
At this point, however, everything went wrong and "Bottled
up Butler" instead of a conquering hero emerged from two
weeks of confused maneuvering and indecisive fighting. The
Army of the Jam,es moved all too slowly, first toward Petersburg, then toward Richmond, and finally ground to a halt in
hard fighting before the Confederate entrenchments at Drury's
Bluff. A fierce counterattack by Beauregard's forces was
checked, but then Butler withdrew his troops into the famous
"bottle" at Bermuda Hundred. Here an entr,enched camp was
established and, according to Grant's rep'ort, the Army of the
James "though in a position of great security was as completely
shut off from further operations directed against Richmond as
if it had be,en in a bottle strongly corked. "19
What, if anything, can be said for a general who let such
an opportunity slip fronl his grasp? Historians have usually
regarded this campaign as conclusive proof of the charge that
General Butler was hopelessly incompetent in the field. His
critics have treated it as a nlajor Union disaster lightened only
by the ludicrous role played by the commanding officer. Clearly
17 Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenwnts, 3 vols., (New York, 1945),
III, 466.
18 Grant to Butler. April 2, 16, 19, 1864, in l\farshall, IV. 7-9, 82-3, 94-5.
19 O. R. o Series I, XXXVI, Part I, 20.
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Butler was guilty of indecision, over-caution, and, what is more
surprising, a lack of imagination.
None of this constitutes
grounds for singling hinl out from the vast number of Union
generals who repeatedly showed the same failings. One need
only study the campaigns of Buell, Meade or Fremont to regain a sense of proportion.
It has often been assumed that Butler could simply have
walked into Petersburg or fought his way to Richmond. The
best evidence is that Petersburg could have been taken in the
first days of the campaign, and that it was the key to Richmond's supply lines. This, however, became clear only after
the whole spring offensive had failed. Grant's orders to Butler said nothing about Petersburg and directed him to advance
on Richmond, keeping close to the river. Inaccurate reports
from Washington informed Butler that Lee's defeated army
was falling back toward Richmond and that Federal troops had
already interrupted the railways into the city. 20 In the light of
these circumstances, Butler's hesitant shift of his attack from
Petersburg to the Richmond defense was logical and in accord
with his instructions. This attack was also stopped, and it
can be argued that a more ruthless and daring comnlander
could have pushed it a bit further. There is ample evidence
that a head-on assault against fortified lines was unlikely to
produce a real breakthrough. Grant himself was to demonstrate this a few weeks later in the futile slaughter at Cold
Harbor. Butler's critics have somewhat inconsistently charged
him with needless sacrifice of life and failure to risk his troops
at all. 21 Casualty figures and regimental histories both indicate
a hard fought battle under difficult conditions and a withdrawal before the Army of the James had been dangerously
hurt. 22 The retreat to Bermuda Hundred was perhaps unwise
and unnecessary but it was in accord with the sections of
Grant's orders which called for the establishment of a secure
and fortified base.
The campaign was severely hampered by quarrels and misunderstanding betw,een Butler and his two corps commanders,
20 Marshall, IV, 181, 182, 188-189.
21 Werlich, 100; W. E. Woodward, Meet General Grant (New York, 1928).
348.
22 A. W. Bartlett, History of the Twelfth New Hampshire Volunteers., (Concord, New Hampshire. 1897), 169-197; O. R. Series I, Part II, XXXVI, 1~.
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Generals W. F. Smith and Quincy Gilmore. The corps commanders were West Pointers with creditable service records but
few less suitable men could have been chosen for this assignment. Both were engin,eers who, when in doubt, were always
inclined to dig in and wait. Both were sensitive, contentious,
and old hands at the ruinous game of army politics. With
two such subordinates and a commander who had a liberal
share of the sanle qualities, the results were predictable. Smith
and Gilmore claimed that Butler confused them with a stream
of contradictory orders and Butler repeatedly charged them
with failure to execute his commands. 23 It is, impolssible to
apportion the share of blame in these disputes but Smith and
Gilmore were eventually relieved because of the indecisive and
quarrelsome tendencies of \vhich Butler had complained. 24
After the war, Grant wrote that Butler had "lacked the technical experience of a military education" but that "as a general
(he) was full of enterprises and resources, and a brave man.
If I had given him corps commanders like Adelbert Ames,
Mackenzie, Weitzel, or Terry, or a dozen others I could mention, he would have made a fine campaign on the James and
helped materially in my plans. "25
Whatever the extenuating circumstances, the campaign failed.
It was, however, in no sense a disaster. A splendid opportunity may have been lost but the Army of the James did
largely carry out its assignment. Butler did for a tim'e threaten
Richmond, and a secure base for future operations was. established. Grant believed Butler's campaign had pinned down only
10,000 of the enemy, but Confederate reports indicate that
Beauregard's forces numbered close to 21,000. 26 The campaign of 1864 brought little credit to any of the Northern commanders but the're is no reason to single out Majo'r General
Butler as the villain of that tragic spring.
The final episode of General Butler's military career was
his failure to attack Fort Fisher. This not only resulted in his
enforced retirement from active service but subjected him to
23 Marshall, IV, 184-188, 221-222, 224, 256.
24 Ibid., 245-246, 522.
25 Young, II, 304.
26 o. R., Series I, XLVII, Part II. 1025 ; Marshall, IV. 251. 255.
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what he described as a "delightful stream of obloquy."27 Butler
commanded the troops in an amphibious attack on the fort
which guarded one of the last ports open to Confederate blockade runners. Always enthusiastic for new weapons, the General had persuaded the navy to try blowing up "the Confederate
Gibraltar" with a powder ship. This device proved ineffective
as the ship exploded so far from the fort that it failed even to
alarm the garrison. After a naval bombardment, the General
landed his troops near the fort but soon hastily reembarked
thenl and departed. This action appeared in an even worse
light when a second expedition under General Terry successfully stormed Fort Fisher at the very time time Butler was
telling a Congressional Committee it was impregnable.
Characteristically, General Butler defended his role at Fort
Fisher as "the best and bravest act of my life. "28 While this
claim seems somewhat startling, one need not accept all the
sweeping charges and denunciations connected with the episode. The naval bombardment of Fort Fisher which preceded
Butler's landing was far less effective than the one which aided
Terry's assault a few weeks later. On the former occasion
the landward defenses, including a mine field, were unharmed.
General Bragg with 6,000 of the Confederacy's blest troops was
within a few miles of the exposed beachhead, where only 3,000
of Butler's men had landed. The decision to abandon the
assault was taken only after Butler had conferred with his officers, who fully concurred. In the second expedition Terry's
attack not only had better fire support but was aided by a landing party of 2,000 marines and sailors. In sp1ite of this the
struggle was a desperate one and cost the Union forces 800
casualties. Most Confederate observers, including the commander of Fort Fisher, were convinced that either of the Federal expeditions could have been smashed if Bragg had attacked
them. After visiting the captured fort, Butler's bitter enemy,
Admiral Porter, wrote that it was far stronger than he had
imagined and wondered how it had been captured at all. 29
27 Butler's Book., 822.
28 Ibid., 82l.
29 General Adelbert Ames, "The Capture of Fort Fisher," in Oivil Wat·
Papers, 2 vols., (Boston, 1900), I, 275-277; Marshall, V, 460-465, 535-536,
566-71, 514. 548-550; Butler's Book, 1121-1122, 1126-1128; John G. Barrett.
The Oivil War in North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1963), 262-80.
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Terry's attack was a bold gamble and in war this is often the
mark of a victorious and skillful leader. That General Butler
did not undertake such a gamble when the odds were mo,re
heavily against success may indicate he was not such a leader.
It does not, however, brand him as either a fool or a coward.
In the field Butler missed several notable, oppolrtunities and
never achieved a notable success.
On the other hand his
claims that "In all military movements I never met disaster,
nor uselessly sacrificed the lives of my men" is essentially co'rrect. This is perhaps to damn him with his own faint praise
but when compared with assertions of his critics and the recoird
of other Union generals it is a restoration of historical perspective.
Whatever his deficiencies as a combat commander Benjamin
Butler showed considerable ability as a nlilitary planner and
administrator. His enormous variety of interests, originality,
and keen grasp of political and business affairs gave him unusual insight into the complexities of waging a major war. Although some of his ideas bordered on the bizarre and he frequently embodied his proposals in a bombastic and aggressive
style, his basic understanding of administrative and strategic
problems was realistic and shrewd. As Commander of the
Departments of Virginia he won the praise of General Grant,
who wrote, "as an administrative officer General Butler has no
superior."30 Quartermaster General Meigs reported Butler
showed "rare and great ability in the management of his department."31 As an unashamed advocate of the age of iron and
steam Butler once shocked an academic audience by proclaiming he would rather have built the Brooklyn Bridge than have
been the greatest poet of any age. 32 He constantly endeavored
to apply the new technology and its inventions to warfare.
Every new weapon received his enthusiastic support, and at
various times he experimented with a steam propelled battery,
wire entanglements, Gatling guns, flame throwers, and plans
for a submarine.33 He was probably the first American general
30 Marshall, IV, 457.
31 Ibid., 258.

32 Holtzman, 220.
33 Robert Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (New York, 1956), 73.

Published by Digital Commons @ Colby, 1964

13

Colby Quarterly, Vol. 6, Iss. 11 [1964], Art. 3

456

Colby Library Quarterly

to use a balloon for reconnaissance and surely the first to attempt to spread propaganda behind the enemy lines with kites.a4
He successfully built a railroad across the beach at Fortress
Monroe and proposed the construction of another line to supply the front at Bermuda Hundred. a5 His canal at Dutch Gap
failed as a war measure but eventually became the main channel
of the Janles, River. 36
Butler was always ready to supply the Lincoln administration or his fellow radicals with strategic evaluations and plans
for victory. These proposals were largely ignored, but in many
respects they anticipated the way in which the war was ultimately fought and won. From the first he was convinced that
the contest must be fought until the South was crushed. To accomplish this he advocated firm measlures directed against the
slaves, property, and civil rights of all who supported rebellion.
For some time this hard policy had limited support in the
North and strikes a somber note even today. Yet this was
the policy finally adopted with reluctance by men like Lincom
and carried out with grim satisfaction by men like Sherman.
In 1863 Butler pointed out to Secretary of the Treasury Chase
that the North with vastly superior resources could risk the
loss of major battles and replace everything but the reputation
of its generals, while one such defeat would be fatal to the
Confederacy. He deplored the waste of manpower involved
in minor expeditions and the protection of Washington. As
an alternative he proposed the concentration of all available
troops in an amphibious force large enough to land and conduct operations deep within the Confederacy.a7
In the spring of the same year he sent a plan to the Committee on the Conduct of the War which propose·d a campaign
quite similar to Sherman's famous march through Georgia and
the Carolinas. a8 General Butler's enthusiasm for reconnaissance
raids, spies, and cloak-and-dagger intrigues has often been a
subject for ridicule but he seems to have been one of the few
34 Ibid. ; Marshall, I, 132, 189, 206, 210-211.
35 Butler's Book, 250; Marshall, IV, 498-499.
36 Trefousse, 170.
37 Marshall, IV, 59-64.
38 Butler's Book, 580-83.
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Northern generals who was able to make fairly realistic evaluations of the forces opposed to him. In 1861, when McClellan was sure there were 150,000 to 200,000 Confederates in
Virginia, Butler insisted the number was no more than 70,000.
Lee's army actually had about 60,000 men at this time. Butler's estimate of the enemy forces on the Bermuda Hundred
front was likewise very close to the number listed by Beauregard. 39
The repeated but futile efforts of Butler's radical allies to
win him a place in Lincoln's cabinet raise intriguing possibilities in the shadowy realms of history as it might have been.
What sort of Secretary of War would Benjamin Butler have
been? His creative talents as an administrator and his understanding of the larger problems of the war would have provided him with qualifications that few could match. Perhap1s
at the War Department he would have found his real place in
history. It is equally possible that his bitter feud with West
Point and his weakness for political intrigue and dubious friends
would have soon led him to another spectacular row and an
early resignation. In any case b'oth his abilities and his failings
would have provided a severe test for the well-known skill
and patience of Abraham Lincoln.
The claim that General Butler waged war ineffectively has
received far less attention than the charge that he conducted
it barbarously. That the South, angered and humiliated by
the occupation of New Orleans, should invent and believe in
the term "Beast Butler" is not surprising. Wartime psychology
creates and propaganda encourages the image of a personal
devil in enemy uniform. Butler's vigorous administration of
the Crescent City in 1862 came at the right nloment to cast
him in such a role. It is, however, surprising to find books a
century later which depict him in almost the same terms as
those employed by Jefferson Davis. 40 Few war-inspired myths
have been so persistent. In popular legend, the Massachusetts general has become at worst a sort of American Richard
39 Ibid., 1075; Marshall, IV, 251, 255; Oommittee on Oonduct Of War. 37th
Cong., Part III, 285-286.
40 The best but by no means the only example of this attitude is found in
Werlicb's "Beast" Butler.
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III or at best what Gamaliel Bradford has classified as "damaged" if not damned souls. 41
On April 27, 1862, General Butler and an occupation force
of 13,700 men disenlbarke,d at New Orleans. The city had
a polyglot population of 168,000 and before the war its streets
and wharves had swarmed with a co,lorful throng of planters,
sailors, slaves, and Irish immigrants. It had a reputation for
refinement and culture cOfilbined with political corruption and
violence. War had changed much of this. The blue-coated
invaders found the city commercially paralyzed, threatened with
starvation, and very close to a state of anarchy. An hysterical
mob had attacked Union sympathizers, tom down the United
States flag from the Customs House, and nearly lynched the
federal officers sent to arrange a surrender. The municipal
authorities refused any cooperation and the mob was determined to allow no relations with the Yankees except gestures
of contempt and hatred. 42
Since 1862 American armies have occupied conquered territory from Manila to Berlin but few of their commanders have
faced a more formidable task than the one assigned to General
Butler. His rule was arbitrary and unpopular, but military
occupation can scarcely be otherwise. This truth has been
grimly brought home to our century but was far less evident in
1862 when Americans had scant experience with the grim
realities of either conquest or occupation. Butler's assignment
was to restore the full authority of the federal government;
this he proceeded to do at the price of one execution and the
banishment of a few dozen Confederate enthusiasts.
The execution of William Mumford, a gambler who had
participated in tearing down a Union flag after the surrender
of the city, was the test case of Butler's authority as well as the
source of profound shock and anger throughout the South. At
the time of Mumford's trial Butler held six Confederate soldiers
who were under sentence of death for breaking parole. In
New Orleans many were convinced the Yankees would not
dare to execute anyone, while Butler believed an example was
41 Damaged Souls (Boston, 1922), 222-258.
4200mmittee on Oonduct of War, 37th Cong.. Part III, 287; Marshall. I,
425; James Parton, General Butler in New Orleans (New York, 1864),
179-280; O. R., (Navies), Series I, XVIII, 159, 229-235, 740, 760.
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necessary. The result was that Mumford was hanged and the
sentences of the six soldiers were commuted.43 Mumford's
fate was a hard one but in no sense a violation of the laws of
war. Butler's early biographer is probably correct in his claim
that "Mumford hanged, the mob was subdued; Mumford
spared, the mob remained to be quelled by final grap,e and
canister."44 Munlford was the sole C'onfederate ever executed
by General Butler. The only other death sentences carried out
during his rule in New Orleans were those of four Union soldiers
found guilty of armed robbery.45
If the execution of Munuord provided the Confede:racy with
a martyr, Butler's famous "women order" gave it a splendid
propaganda weapon. The women of New Orleans had directed
a systematic campaign of insults against Union officers, which
ranged from merely dramatically turning away to spitting upon
them. The General was aware that attempts to arrest such
ladies might provoke serious disorder while to allow such incidents to continue would undermine the' authority and morale
of his command. His solution was a general order stipulating
that "when any female shall by word, gesture, or movement,
insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United
States she shall be regarded and held liab'le to be treated as a
woman of the town plying her avocation."46 Dienunciations
of this "infamous proclamation" were made not only in the
South but in the British Parliament. Garbled legend has even
converted Butler's order into an invitation to his licentio'us
troops to seize the beauty as well as the booty of New Orleans.
In reality the order so,lved the problem with no harm to anyone. The ladies of the Crescent City abruptly ceased their
unladylike conduct and there were no more incidents. The
Confederate commander in Louisiana later wrote that there
was not "one single instance of a lady being insulted" by Butler's troops.47
The Butler regime in New Orleans was successful not merely
in restoring the authority of the United States but in providing
43
44
45
46
47

Marshall, I, 573-575.
Parton, 35l.
Marshall, I, 502-3 ; Butler's
:Marshall, I, 490.
Ibid .. III. 130.
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the city with an effective administration under very difficult
circumstances. His military commissions and provost marshals
were harsh, arbitrary, and not entirely free from corruption,
but they accomplished a great deal. The streets of this traditionally violent community were probably better policed and
safer than at any other time in the nineteenth century.48 Confederate sympathizers had expected the summer climate and
yellow fever to strike a deadly blow at the Yankee invaders.
Butler's troops were disturbed by these predictions which
seemed to be supported by the appalling nlortality rates of
previous years. Applications for leave piled up on the commanding general's desk and friends advised him to transfer his
headquarters to Ship Island in the Gulf. Butler stayed and
forced his officers to do likewise. He then set about an energetic sanitary campaign which imposed a rigorous quarantine,
and put 2,000 men to work scouring the streets and removing
the accumulation of filth from the city's nunlerous canals and
ditches. Owners of shops and houses were forced to clean
them up under penalty of arrest and confiscation. The result
was that there were only two cases of yellow fever and New
Orleans was a healthier place than ever before. 49
In this type of situation where he could exercise his talent
for engineering, sanitation, and civic planning Butler was at
his best. He repeated his experiments in municip'al government
and sanitation while in conlffiand at Norfolk, Virginia, in 1864.
When on a yachting cruise to Havana in 1881 the aging general
looked longingly at that city and carefully noted how it could be
captured, drained, and thoroughly scrubbed. 50
When the Union forces arrived they found a large part of
the population of New Orleans unemployed and faced with
an acute shortage of food. The poverty of the people astonished the New England soldiers, whose camps were soon
haunted by poor Irish, Germans, and Negroes who sought the
refuse from their kitchens. 51 General Butler immediately or48 Butler's Book, 394-395.
49 Ibid., 395-410; Oommittee on Oonduct of War. 37th Cong., Part III,

355-356.
50 Ibid., 410-413; Blanche Butler Ames, Ohronicles of the Nineteenth Oentury, 2 vols., (Boston, 1957), II, 521-522.
51 John William DeForest, A Volunteer's Adventures (New Haven. 1946),
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dered the distribution of army rations and eventually organized
a relief system which fed and maintained over 34,000 people. 52
The reluctant city officials were dragooned into employing 1500
men on public works. The major part of this relief program
was financed by a special tax levied against business firms and
cotton brokers who were known to have contributed to the
Confederate cause. 53 Southern diarists and historians were almost unanimous in their condemnation of these measures.
What the Negroes, poor whites, and German immigrants
thought of Butler's rule remains unrecorded as they were not
the type of people who leave diaries or write histories. That
all New Orleans was united against "the Beast" is, however,
clearly disproved by the fact that nearly 5,000 white Louisianians enlisted in his regiments. 54
In the occupation of New Orleans and his later campaigns,
General Butler and his troops acted in the same manner as
other Civil War armies. In Louisiana property was often confiscated and the soldiers engaged in considerable foraging and
looting. These practices were almost universal and appear to
have been far more extensive under Butler's successor, General Banks. 55 The Civil War had its full share of systematic
devastation, massacres, and extermination tactics against irregulars. Generals Sherman, Sheridan, and Forrest are only
a few of the commanders involved in such incidents. 56 While
Butler often spoke of his readiness to do terrible things to all
rebels, there is no record that he was ever guilty of such violations of the law of war.
Every account of Butler's career describes the execution of
Mumford, the "women order," and the imprisonment of Confederate sympathizers at Fort Jackson. Few have noted his
acts of generosity and kindness. He arranged for the wife of
a wounded Confederate officer to join her husband and offered
General Beauregard a pass to visit his sick wife in New Or52 Ibid., 21-22; Marshall, II, 30; Comm{;ttee on Conduct of War, 37th Cong.,
Part III. 355.
53 Marshall, II, 216-218, 520-521, 489; III, 131.
54 Oommittee on Oonduct 01 War, 37th Cong., Part III, 357.
55 DeForest, 74-76, 156; Allan Nevins, The War for the Union, 2 vols., (New
York, 1960), II, 295-296.
56 Ibid., II, 293-297.
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leans. H·e was quite ready to recommend a parole for his old
enemy, Pierre Soule, and sent financial aid to alleviate the imprisonment of his former opponent in Louisiana, General
Thompson. 57 These examples are cited not to prove that Butler was a saint or to disprove that at times he could be vindictive, but merely to indicate that like most men he was capable
of altruistic actions. This would seem obvious except for the
legend of "Beast Butler." There is little in Butler's record at
New Orleans or in the field to justify the label.
II

The Politician

While he seldom was directly implicated in the major scandals of an age when political life was often crude and selfseeking Butler, the politician, was no less. controversial than
Butler, the major general. The conduct of dishonest or incompetent friends and associates cast a shadow over his political
as well as his military career. SOUle reformers regarded him
as a sinister influence behind all sorts of shady deals, and
political opponents used "Butlerism" as a symbol for the corruption of "The Gilded Age."58 Some historians have accepted this picture without question and quoted denunciations
by Butler's enenlies as if they were conclusive evaluations of
his character. 59 Like many of his contemporaries Butler
sought patronage and political favors; unlike most of them he
boldly upheld this systenl. He opposed civil service reform
and openly supported the "salary grab." When the House
censured representatives Ames and Whittemore for conduct
common to a large portion or its membership it was Congressman Butler who defended them. His speeches were marked
by an element of cynicism but showed defiance of the hypocrisy
demonstrated by many of his frightened colleagues. 6o It was
57 l\farshall, II, 216-218, 520-521, 389 ; III, 131.
58 George F. Hoar. Autc,biography of Twenty Years, 2 vols., (New York,
1903), I, 329-64; Moorfield Storey, The Record oj Benjamin F. Butler (Boston, 1883),65-76.
59 James Ford Rhodes, History oj the United Sta,tes from the Oompromise
Of 1850 tc, the McKinley-Bryan Oampaign oj 1896, 8 vols., (New York, 1920),
V, 308-312.
60 Holtzman, 197; Speech of the Honorable Benjamin Butler, "Salaries of
Members of Congress," Pamphlet, Washington Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1873. Oongressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 3rd session, 1651.
Appendix 176, V, 311-312.
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this defiance of respectability rather than specific evidence of
corruption that made Butler instead of Blaine, Colfax O,f Conklin the primary target of reformers.
Apart from his rather matter-of-fact approach to the techniques of his trade Butler was by no means a typical party
politician. He was as incapable of being a regular party hack
as he was of being an army regulation general. It has often
been assumed that he was the boss of a powerful though somewhat mysterious political nlachine with which he do'minated
Massachusetts politics and exerted considerable influence in
Washington. There seems to be little factual basis for this
assumption. Butler was one of the few prominent American
politicians who achieved success without a solid base of support founded on party loyalty, local power, or a dramatically
popular issue. On four occasions he performed the dangerous
feat of switching party labels and spent most of his career in
a minority faction of the party to which he nominally belonged.
Except for a short period during Grant's terms as president he
was unable to command significant support from the national
administration. Throughout most of his political life the Governor and Senators from his own state were his enemies. The
tightly knit group of proper Bostonians and businessmen who
constituted the power elite of Massachusetts Republicanism opposed him at every election. He was likewise often without
the politician's most basic comfort, a permanent local following. From 1866 to 1874 Congressman Butler represented an
Essex district where he had no previous ties and nlaintained
residence with "a tent on the beach." He· won his final election to Congress from a different district and became a Democratic Governor of Massachusetts largely through the ballots of
urban voters in Boston. 61 As a friend of Southern Democrats
in the 1850s and an advocate of Greenbacks in the 1870s he
could hardly expect to ride a wave of public approval in the
Bay State. Benjamin Butler did wield influence and achieve
considerable power both in his own state and in Congress, but
his success was a product of his own aud;acity, ability, and
persuasiveness rather than the op,erations of a well-entrenched
political machine.
61 American Almanac !or

188!,

(New York, 1884). 227.
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Because of his indifference to any fixed ideology or permanent party allegiance Butler is often regarded as a man without principle or consistency who would abandon any cause for
p,ersonal gain. A careful examination of the numerous issues
on which he invariably took a radical and vehement stand goes
far to refute this belief. In many respects he emerges much
more consistent in his views than the men who faithfully voted
the straight ticket and foliowed the ,orthodox Republican or
Democratic party line. Benjamin Butler's political beliefs can
best be described as those of a Jacksonian democrat. Family
tradition and early associations directed him toward the Jacksonian principles of radical democracy and social reform. In
later years he merely modified or exte,nded these principles to fit
the new conditions of the postwar era.
His support for the rights of the underprivileged, extension
of the suffrage, and devotion to the Union were all in harmony with this tradition. It was also expressed in his lifelong
conflict with the respectable, established, and aristocratic elements represente,d by West Point, Harvard College, and the
Whig-Republican oligarchs of Massachusetts. By 1861 he was
interpreting the Civil War as a conflict between aristocratic slave
power and democracy. His final message to the people of New
Orleans proclaimed: "1 saw this Rebellion was a war of aristocrats against the middling man, of the rich against the poor,
a war of the landowner against the laborer . . . 1 found no
conclusion to it, save in the subjection of the few and the disenthralment of the many."62 His postwar record as an allout supporter of radical reconstruction and civil rights was in
full accord with this declaration. Even the nlore dubious side
of General Butler's politics such as his defense of the spoils
system, appeals to class prejudice, and spread eagle nationalism
were partial reflections of the Jacksonian tradition.
Young Ben Butler first entered politics as a champion of the
mill workers of Lowell. Forty-five years later he rounded out
his career as the Greenback Labor candidate for president.
He was an active campaigner for shorter hours and helped to
win the ten-hour day for mill and railway workers and the
62 Marshall, II, 555.
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eight-hour day for federal employees.63 At various times he
proposed the regulation of monopolies, public ownership of
railroads, and a national relief program to settle the unemployed on western lands. 64 In 1884 he ran for president on
a platform advocating woman suffrage, an income tax, and
elimination of the "veto" power of Congressional committees.65
If conservatives found these views somewhat disturbing, the
financial community regarded Butler's persistent support of
Greenbacks, free coinage of silver, and taxation of government
bonds with a horror tempered only by derision. While the
details of Butler's "American System of Finance" may have
been impractical, the' nation has since adopted a monetary system far closer to his "heresies" than it is to the financial orthodoxy of the nineteenth century. In Massachusetts Ben Butler
was a constant ally of the Irish nlinority and as governor he
appointed the first Catholic judge in the history of the Commonwealth. 66 He was also prominent in the long but successful struggle to repeal the poll tax and establish a secret b'allot. 61
As a radical reformer Butler may well have been a man
ahead of his times but it is his support for the cause of the
Negro that is most relevant to twentieth-century America. Like
many Northerners his views were reshape,d by the outbreak of
civil war. As a Democrat he had almost instinctively sided
with the mill workers and Irish immigrants but the same party
affiliation made him indifferent to the wrongs of the slave.
With the outbreak of what he regarded as a slaveholder's rebellion his conversion was rapid and decisive. By August 1861
he was writing that the war seemed like judgment upon the
nation for its efforts to avoid the slavery question, and asked,
"Shall we now end the war and not eradicate the cause? ...
Will not God demand this of us now He has taken away all
excuse for not pursuing the right?"68 Two months previously
63 Trefousse, 38, 219, 246; Marlon Cahill, Shorter Hours (New York, 1932),
107 ; Butler's Book, 91-109.
64 Oong. Record, 45th Cong., 2nd Session, 3323, 3631-3635, 4380.
65 Kirk Porter and Donald Johnson, National Party Plat!(jrm8 181,0-1956
(Urbana, 1956), 69-70.
66 Butler's Book, 975.

67 Trefousse, 246-247 ; Butler'8 Book, 114-115.
68 Marshall, I, 216.
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he had pushed the government into the first hesitant step toward emancipation by declaring slaves who escaped to his
lines at Fortress Monroe "contraband."
In New Orleans the Massachusetts general made another
important decision when he used the city's regiments of free
Negroes in the federal service. In practice few questions were
asked about the previous status of recruits, and the number of
free Negroes had been vastly increased by Butler's emancipation of the slaves of all who claimed foreign citizenship. 69 The
formation of Negro reginlents in Louisiana was one of the first
steps toward the enlistment of troops who totaled over 178,000
men by the end of the war. 70 While at one time he had been
skeptical of the Negro's reliability as a combat soldier, Butler
soon became their stanchest advocate. At a time when most
Union officers were ready to accept former slaves only as teanlsters or laborers, General Butler was vigorously defending their
good discipline and fighting qualities. 71 By November 1863,
when he assumed command in Virginia, Butler had so fully
established a reputation as a friend of the Negro soldier that
SOllle of his white troops conlplained that he had "nigger on
the brain" and "would punish a man for looking crosswise at
one of the sable brethren."12 In Virginia Butler was not only
concerned with his colored regiments for whom he established
a savings bank, but also provided food, shelter, and medical
attention for the large Negro population in his department.
The school he established for Negro children may well have
been the first federal project for their education. 73 The General felt that his faith in the Negro soldier was fully justified
by the heroic assault of Parrish's division at Newmarket
Heights. 74 After viewing the field covered with bodies of the
69 Ibid., 192, 209-11, 328, 400; Oomm'ittee on Oonduct of lVar, 37th Cong.,
Part III, 358.
70 David Donald, Why the North Won the Oivil War (Baton Rouge. 1960),
82.
71 Marshall, I, 519 ; II, 436-8; III, 182 ; IV 852 ; V, 215.
72 Barrett, 177.
73 J. G. Randall, The Oivil War and Recon8truction (Boston, 1937), 497;
Benjamin Quarles, The Negro Vn the Oivil War (New York, 1953), 121-2;
George \V. William, A History of the Negro Race in America (New York,
1885), 403 ; :Marshall, V, 610-611.
74 O. R., Series I, III, 65 ; Butler's Book, 730-743.
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attacking column, Butler wrote his wife: "The man who says
the Negro will not fight is a coward . . . His soul is blacker
than the face of those dead Negroes upturned toward heaven
in solemn protest against hinl and his prejudices. I have not
been so nl0ved during this war as I was by this sight."75
Upon his return to active politics Butler was one of the most
powerful advocates of radical reconstruction. After a triumphal
reception by the Negroes of Richnl0nd in 1868 he wrote: "It is
worth the war to have liberated a race so kindly and so grateful. Infamous, most infamous will the Republican party collectively and individually be if for one moment or in one jot
or tittle we abate the protection thrown around that people
"76
In Congress he was an ardent supporter of Negro
suffrage and civil rights, and achieved considerable notoriety
because of his vehement attacks on the Ku Klux Klan and
other attempts to restore the traditional Southern systenl. 77
In 1877 he denounced the Hayes administration for its abandonment of the Negro, which he felt came very close to the
infamy he had feared nine years previously. 78
History has generally treated Butler and the other radical
Republicans as selfish and vindictive demagogues. A revision
of this caricature has begun only in the last two decades. For
a nation again debating this question of civil rights and social
justice for the Negro the words of Congressman Ben Butler,
spoken some ninety years ago, are still controversial and still
highly relevant.
We were told yesterday that we must respect in this regard the prejudices of the South ... We cannot respect them: we lament them, and
we pity them. With deep sorrow, and not offensively I say this: prejudice can never be the grounds of legislation in regard to the rights of
the citizen-never. We must legislate to give every man who is a citizen of the United States all the rights that every other man has. We
demand that prejudice shall square itself with the law. 79
75 Marshall, V, 192.
76 Marshall. V. 720.
77 Oongressi6nal Globe" 41st Congress, 1st Session 253, 625; 2nd Session,
appendix 576; 3rd Session, 710; 42nd Congress, 1st Session, 166, 441;
I-Ioar, I, 205-6; James G. Blaine, Twenty Years in Oongress, 2 vols., (Norwich, Conn., 1884), II, 469; Holtzman, 181-2.
78 Trefousse, 235-236.
79 Speech of the Hon. Benjamin F. Butler, Jan. 7, 1874, Pamphlet.
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While like all p,olitical realists Butler was at times willing to
compromise and maneuver on civil rights as well as other legislation, he essentially remained faithful to the cause of the
Negro. He was personally friendly and helpful to the first
Negro congressmen who had bee'n ignored by most of their
colleagues. so He endeavored to appo!int a Negro cadet to West
Point and, when his own son graduated from the Academy,
Butler insisted that he be assigned to a Negro regiment. One
of Butler's last significant contributions to public life was the
appointment of the first Negro judge in Massachusetts. s1
As a chanlpion of minority groupls and a proponent of new
and radical doctrines Butler has been vindicated by the passage
of tinle. Labor legislation and universal suffrage have long
been on the statute books, and the federal government has once
again moved to protect the rights of its Negro citizens. The
General's critics can still raise the question ,of his sincerity and
claim that his interest in the underdog was largely directed to
promoting the fight. He was of course a working politician
who sought p,ower and place, and a man who thrived on noisy
controversy. But in addition to this he was, an unflinching
defender of unpiopular causes, and in their defense his political
career attained both consistency and significance.
III

The Citizen

Butler's reputation as a soldier and a statesman has been
overshadow,ed by charges that his administration was corrupt
and that he used his positions as a major general and public
official for personal gain. It is impossible to reach final and
clear-cut answers to these accusations which would either
triumphantly acquit or fully condemn him.
What can be
demonstrated is that General Butler's case is by no means
unique and that many of the actions for which he has been
criticized were done openly and with the full approval of his
superiors. It can also, be shown that thorough and repeated
80 Frederick Douglas, Life and Times of Frederick Douglas (Boston, 1881),
398; Trefousse, 311, note 70; Russell H. Conwell, Hon. Benjamin F. Butler
(Boston, 1874), 8.
81 Butler's Book, 80, 969.
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examination of his affairs has failed to produce decisive evidence of wrongdoing.
The story of contraband trade and commodity speculation
is a complex and far from edifying chapter in the histo,ry of
the Civil War. Secession and war had cut asunder the oolootless economic ties betw,een two p'arts of a nation which had
been mutually dependent. As soon as Union troops penetrated
into the Confederacy a rapid and almost spontaneous effort
to restore these relations took place. In the wake of every
Yankee army there came a swarm of speculators eager to find
Southern cotton and sugar. Just beyond the picket lines was
a host of planters, farmers, and traders anxious to obtain
food, salt, and manufactured goods. In theory both Washington and Richmond were opposed to any dealing with the enemy.
In practice neither government could maintain such a positio'n.
Economic necessity, the impossibility of enforcement, and the
hope that they would gain the advantage drove both sides to
accepting and even promoting trade across the lines. This
trade was of course to be carefully regulated. Unscrupulo,us
and profit-hungry nlen on both sides soon made a farce of
the regulations. 82
Those who insist upon General Butler's guilt base their case
to a large extent upon the clainl that wherever he appeared
illegal trade and sp,eculation flourished. Butler's assignments,
first to New Orleans and then to the coastal region of Virginia and North Carolina, placed him in areas where the problem of trade was sure to arise. Contrary tOI the implications
of his critics, he did not originate this trade and it was, in
no sense a phenomenon unique to his departments. Memphis
and Natchez, for example, sent millions of dollars wortll of
goods into the Confederacy, and General Sherman declared
that "Cincinnati furnished more contraband goods than
Charleston and had done more to prolong the war than South
Carolina."83 Many areas besides Butler's command were equally involved in trading with the C'onfederates, and speculation
and traffic in contraband goo,ds continued to boom long after
82 A.

S. Roberts,

"The Federal
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A.merican Historical Review, XXXII, (January 1927), 262-275.
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he had left the scene. After General Banks had assumed command at New Orleans, Collector Denison reported that a host
of speculators had come down with his entourage and believed
that "there is a great deal more corruption here now than even
under Butler." A little later he wrote of the "outrageous speculation in all directions."84 In Virginia an active exchange of
cotton for coffee and bacon went on after Butler had been
removed from command. 85 Many of Butler's critics give the
impression that illegal trade was confined to his department
and also imply that he was the only general whose name can
be connected with such activities.86 In view of the fact that
trading and sp,eculation appeared wherever Union and Confederates lives converged, it is not surprising to find that a
large number of officers, including at least five generals, were
reported to be promoting such activity or sharing in its
profits.87 These reports do not of course prove the guilt of
the officers involved nor would such proof denlonstrate Butler's
innocence. They do indicate that accusations and rumors of
corruption were not confined to one major general from
Massachusetts.
There can be little doubt that Butler looked favorably upon
many of the commercial activities in his department and in
some cases actively encouraged exchange of goods with the
Confederates. What is equally beyond doubt is that this policy
reilected the views of the administration in Washington and
frequently had its specific approval. President Lincoln once
stated that cotton must be obtained and if necessary it was
better to give the Confederates guns for it than to let them
exchange it abroad for guns and ammunition.88 General Halleck ordered Grant to provide every facility for getting cotton
even if it had to be exchanged for gold, and spoke of "the ab84 Marshall, III, 47-48, 72.
85 Ludwell H. Johnson, "Contraband Trade During the Last Year of the
Civil War," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX, (June 1962), 642.
86 Rhodes, V, 303 ; Werlich, 60-81,90-94.
87 O. R., Series IV, III, 282 ; XXXII, III, 796 ; LIII, II, 544; XVII, II, 186;
Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, 4 vols., (New York, 1949-58),
IV, 166; III, 433, 538.
88 Roy P. Basler (ed.), The Oollected Works &1 Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols.,
(New Brunswick, 1953), VIII, 163-4,
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solute necessity of encouraging that trade . . ."89 The Treasury
Department informed its agents that it was essential to get
cotton and other commodities out of the Confederacy and even
suggested that there was no necessity to inquire into the origin
of these goods or the morals of their possessors. 90 In New
Orleans Butler was merely following the sanle policy when he
told Lincoln's special commissioner, Reverdy Johnson: "I will
assure safe conduct, open market, and prompt shipment of
all such property sent to New Orleans, and the owner, were
he Slidell himself, should have the pay for his cotton if sent
here under this assurance."91 This declaration, emphatically
endorsed by Johnson, was also discussed and ap'proved by
Secretary Chase and Secretary of State Seward.92
The two instances in which the commander at New Orleans
was most directly involved in commercial transactions were
fully reported to the govemnlent and received its approval.
Shortly after arriving in the Crescent City Butler purchased
several shiploads of cotton and sugar and dispatched them to
Boston. He reported the matter to Washington and explained
that he had saved unnecessary expense in providing ballast
for the ships. He also suggested the government could p,urchase the cotton and sugar at cost. The War Department
took a dim view of the General's personal participation in
trade but the Assistant Secretary wrote that Butler's action
had been "wise and patriotic and ought to be protected by
the government."93 The second case involved shipments of
salt from New Orleans to Mobile, where it was exchanged for
cotton. This transaction as reported by a Confederate diarist
and Collector Denison has often been presented as the conclusive proof of Butler's dishonesty and treachery.94 Again, however, the record shows that Reverdy Johnson approved But89

o.

R., Series I, XVII; II, 150, 186.

90 Oommittee on Oonduct oj War, 37th Cong., Part III, 611-13.

91 Marshall, II, 94.
92 Ibid., David Donald, Inside Lincoln's Oabinet., The Oivil War Diarves of
Salmon P. Chase (New York, 1954), 164-165.
93 Marshall, I, 579, 612, 628; II, 78; III, 5; Oommittee on Oonduct of War,
37th Cong., III, 360-362.
94 Werlich, 72-73; J. B. Jones, A Rebel War Olerk's Diary, 2 vols., (Philadelphia, 1866), I, 189.
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ler's permits for this trade, and assured him that such shipments were fully in accord with the government's policy and
constituted one of the advantages it expected to gain from
the occupation of New Orleans. 95
Butler's assignment to the Department of Virginia and North
Carolina in November 1863 again involved him in an area
where he was accused of granting passes and otherwise promoting illegal trade. The administration in Washington was
partly responsible for this situation. In 1862 Congress had
endeavored to tighten the controls on contraband trade by
making it a carefully supervised government monopoly. The
administration was so intent on retaining the supposed advantages of this traffic that Treasury Department regulations, an
executive order, and numerous special permits actually made
it easier than ever to ship goods into the Confederacy.96 The
speculators and traders who infested the Department of Virginia often carried permits from General Butler. Many of
them also carried Treasury Departnlent contracts, recommendations from prominent officials, and occasionally passes
signed by the President. Most permits were issued by special
agent Risely of the Treasury Department, and the sponsors of
various trading operations included Butler's political rival Governor Andrew of Massachusetts and President Lincoln's friends,
Ward Lannon and George Ashum. 97
The most prominent case involve,d George Lane, who had
formulated a plan to exchange several shipments of goods
for $500,000 worth of cotton. Butler aided this enterprise by
recommending Lane to the President, issuing passes, and securing the release of Lane and one of his partners when they
were intercepted. The seizure of Lane's ship, the Philadelphia,
brought about investigations of the department by a congressional committee and a military commission. The investigators soon discovered that Lane had discussed his project with
Secretary Chase and held government contracts to obtain cotton. In addition to Butler's p'ermit, he held passes signed by
95 Marshall, II, 120-122.
96 Johnson, 637-639.
97 Hou8e Report #24, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, 107, 177.
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the Treasury agent, the commander at New Bern, and Abraham Lincoln. 98
One may well doubt the policy of the Lincoln's administration in securing cotton at the price of an extensive, demoralizing
trade in contraband goods. The cause of the Union might
have be,en better served by Grant's propolsals to suppress all
relations with C'onfederate territory. The fact remains that
an active encouragement of trade was the government's policy
throughout most of the war. Butler seems to have had little
doubt that his policies would meet with approval in Washington. He reported his cotton shipments, and salt transaction
to the War Department and Reverdy Johnson, later recounting
them to the Committee on the Conduct of the War. 99 The
investigation of contraband trade in Virginia appears to have
been in part due to a conversation between Butler and Assistant Secretary of War Dana in which the General described
how the existing regulations fostered such practices. 10o Butler's removal from command, first in New Orleans and then
in Virginia, were due to doubts concerning his military capacity and his stormy relations with foreign consuls rather
than dissatisfaction with the commercial side of his. departments. 101
In connection with a suit arising from the confiscation of
gold in New Orleans, Butler wrote: "I am as willing that
every act of my life shall be investigated as, this may 00."102
This claim was to be fully and endlessly put to the test. Benjamin Butler was in all probability the most thoroughly investigated man of his generation. While he was in command,
special representatives of the President and the War Departnlent investigated his conduct. After his removal, two military
commissions and a congressional committee inquired into his
administration in Virginia and New Orleans. During and
after the war, a host of political opponents continued to hunt
98 Johnson, 646-52; Marshall, IV, 489-490; V, 576-82; O. R., (Navies),
Series I, X, 163-164.
99 Marshall, Y, 579; II, 120; Oommittee on Conduct oj War, 37th Cong.,
3rd Session, Part III, 360-362.
100 Marshall, V, 502.
101 Ibid., II, 309, 564, 571 ; IV, 258, 457-459; V, 468.
102 Ibid., V, 420.
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for evidence against him. Nearly all of these investigations
were conducted by men hostile to Butler and in several instances they resorted to any means to fOffilulate a case against
him. lo3 In 1874 Congressman Butler defiantly told the House
that he had lived under a microscope for fourteen years and
had thus been comp·elled to lead an upright life "or some nlan
would in all those years have got a rap at old cock-eye."lo4
It would probably be a matter of little surprise to the Congressman if he could know that some historians and biographers are still seeking to get in a rap or two ninety years later.
The fact that General Butler's career was scrutinized" by
men unfriendly to him is of far less, importance than what
was actually discovered by the investigators. A military commission sent to New Orleans in 1865 submitted a report of
400 pages but President Andrew Johnson, one of Butler's most
bitter enemies, refused to make it public. lo5 The only portion
of the report ever released was contained in a speech by
Senator James Fowler denouncing Butler's efforts to impeach
the President. Fowler recounted the familiar story of Butler's
cotton and salt shipments, and criticized the activities of the
General's brother, Andrew Jackson Butler. The only new
charge contained in the speech was based upon the statement
by Jacob Barker, a New Orleans banker, who claimed that
Butler had borrowed $100,000 for the purpose of financing his
brother's speculations. lo6 General Butler did have numerous
financial transactions with the bank but was for some time using
loans and his own funds to pay his troops. He had also borrowed money for the cotton shipments which were reported
to and approved by the War D,epartment. lo7
The military commission and congressional committee which
examined the commercial side of the Department of Virginia
had no difficulty in showing the existence of an extensive trade
with the enemy, but they also discovered that much of this
103 Ibid., 533, 550, 561, 564, 586-593; House Reports, 38th Congress, 2nd
Session, #24; O. R., Series I, XLVIII, Part I, 1166.
104 Oongressional Record, 43rd Congress, 1st Session, II, 5220-28.
105 Executive Document #96, 39th Congress, 1st Session, May 3, 1866.
106 Oongressional Globe, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, 4511-4512.
107 Marshall, I, 455; II, 31-33; Oommittee on Oonduct of War, 37th Cong.,
3rd Session, Part III, 361.
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trade was authorized by the Treasury Department and the
President. The commission made every 'effort to get testimony
against Butler and at times seems to have sought the aid of
disappointed speculators and encouraged witnesses to save
themselves by incriminating the General or his. relatives. 108 The
most that came out of this was the statement by an enemy of
the former department commander that Butler "was interested
in permits."109 It was established that Butler's friends and
military associates had used their influence to secure permits
or share in the business of the trading stores set up under
Treasury regulations. 11o Attempts to prove that Butler's
brother-in-law, Fisher Hildreth, was a partner in these sto,res
or was engaged in cotton speculation produced only hearsay
evidence which was in conflict with other testimony.111
J ames Ford Rhodes's severely unfavorable judgment of Butler's character has done much toward establishing the hostile
treatment which the General has received from later historians. An examination of Rhodes's sources reveals that in
many cases he uncritically accepted the statements of Butler's
enemies. He cites, for example, Governor Andrew's report
that Butler's recruiting of troops "seems to have been designed
and adopted simply to afford means to persons of bad character to make money."112 In actuality the Governo'r's objections were based upon the fact that Butler wished to recruit
troops directly under federal auspices rather than those of the
state. While willing to consider the Governor's objections to
any specific persons Butler was also determined to' comnlission
a number of Democrats. 113 For Rhodes, "the suspicion (of
Butler's dishonesty) b,ecomes a strong presumption from the
words of General George H. Gordon who was in a position
to acquire accurate information and judge fairly."114 Gordon
may well have acquired information but the fairness of his
108 Marshall, V, 533, 550, 556, 561, 564, 587, 589-93.
109 Johnson, 643.
110 Ibid.~ 643-6; Marshall, IV, 474-475.
111 House Reports~ 38th Congress, 2nd Session, #24, 124.
112 Rhodes, V, 312.
113 Marshall, I, 239, 246-292.
114 Rhodes, V, 308-11.
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judgment is open to question. He was at one time a protege
of Butler's but had broken with him and headed the military
commission which did its best to find evidence against his
former Department Commander. Gordon's attacks on Butler
were made in the course of a stumping tour on behalf of
Butler's congressional opponent, and by innuendoes in his war
diary.ll5
Somewhat more substantial evidence is provided by the reports of G. S. Denison, the Collector at New Orleans, to Secretary Chase. ll6 Denison's letters reveal him to be an inconclusive witness for or against Butler. He was obviously impressed by the General's ability but was at the same time constantlyencountering cases of illegal trade and rumors that
Butler was involved. He never seems to have made up his
mind whether to believe the rumors or the General's. explanations. On September 9, 1862, he wrote: "I have never been
able to discover any good proof that General Butler has improperly done or permitted anything for his own pecuniary advantage. He is such a smart man that it would, in any case, be
difficult to discover what he wished concealed."ll7 By October
he was much disturbed by the trade in salt and cotton, and
Butler's explanation that it "was the policy of the government"
did not satisfy him. The correspondence between Reverdy
Johnson and Butler shows that this explanation was in reality
quite accurate. ll8 By November Denison had swung around
to the view that "the affairs of the Dept. of the Gulf are managed with entire honesty" and there was no longer any trade
with the enemy."119 His final verdict, after Butler had left
New Orleans, was that the General had served his government
and country well, and had done "no bad thing except permitting his brother to nlake money dishonestly."120
115 George H. Gordon, A War Diary oj the Events in the War oj the Great
(Boston, 1882); Marshall, IV, 64, 71; V, 306, 503,
550-51, 587 ; Rhodes, V, 31l.
116 Denison reports were used by Rhodes and later published in the Report
of the American Historical AS80ciation, 1902, II, and in Marshall's Oorre-

Rebellion, 1863-1865

spondence oj General Butler.

117 Marshall, II, 270-27l.
118 Ibid., 120, 357.
119 Ibid., 516.
120 Ibid., 566.
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The least plausible argument in the case against Butler is
the one that, as he left a fortune estimated at $7,000,000, he
must have acquired it by dishonest means during the war.
There is no positive 'evidence to support this charge which
appears to have originated in the campaign speeches of General
Gordon. Rhodes not only picked up Gordon's claim that
Butler's fortune increased from $150,000 to $7,000,000 between 1861 and 1868 but also attributed it to the General's
friends rather than to a bitter political enemy.121 General
Butler had a lucrative law practice', shares in the p,rofitable
Middlesex Mills, and numerous successful ventures in real
estate and business. His wealth can easily be explained in a
more plausible way than assuming it originated in stolen spoons
or contraband trade.
While there is almost no real proof that General Butler
shared in or profited from the numerous speculations and
shady enterprises which flourished in his department, it cannot
be denied that he surrounded himself with friends and associates of questionable character. These friends, appear to have
frequently secured favors and reaped substantial gains. In
New Orleans his brother Andrew was active in cotton speculation, importation of Texas cattle, sugar plantations, and numerous other transactions. James Parton's defense of Andrew's
activities as the legal and useful services, of a clever b·usinessman is not convincing and at best leaves a good deal to be
explained. To Mrs. Butler, Andrew represented a constant
source of trouble and a threat to her husband's career. 122 Later,
in the Department of Virginia, Butler's friends, military subordinates and relations were again involved in commercial transactions on the uncertain borderline created by the Treasury regulations. 123
The question naturally arises how one of the shrewdest men
of his generation repeatedly became involved in compromising
121 Rhodes, V, 308.
122 Parton, 303, 411; Marshall, I, 634-5; II, 242, 320, 422-426, 503, 530,
560.
123 Marshall, IV, 474-5, 493, fS15, 523; Johnson, 643-5; House Reports, 38th
Congress, 2nd Session, #24, 124.
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situations in spite of the warnings of friends and the entreaties
of a devoted wife. Part of the answer lies in the fact that few
men cared less about proprieties, conventions, and appearances
than Benjamin Butler. He believed with the Administration
that reestablishment of trade and procurement of cotton were
of vital importance to the North. In 1865 he drew up a
memorandum which described the advantages he believed
would arise fronl partial suspension of the blockade. 124 It was
also Butler's versatility and wide range of interest which got
him into trouble. Ideally, of course, he should have put
aside all concern for law, politics, and business as soon as he
put on a uniform. Such an act of renunciation would have
been conlpletely out of character. It has often been stated
that Butler was the most noted of the "political generals."
Many of his numerous conflicts with foreign consuls, civil authorities, chaplains, and fellow officers originated in his tendency to deal with them in the manner of a political leader or
prosecuting attorney instead of that of a major general. It is
equally true that Butler the businessnlan and enthusiast for
industrial progress could never simply ignore the commercial
asp;ects of his military command. This nlight have caused little
harm except for the misplaced loyalty and excessive toleration
which allowed his friends to profit fronl his position.
Nearly every evaluation of Benjamin Butler has stressed the
unusual and colorful aspects of his career. It is indeed possible
that Charles Dana's description of him as "the most original,
the most American, and the most picturesque character of our
public life" was a valid one. 125 This emphasis on the colorful
has, however, sometinles obscured tlle fact that in many respects he was typical of the soldiers and politicians of his
time. His fondness for controversy and resounding pronouncements frequently made him appear more extreme in his
views than was actually the case. He appears to have taken
considerable delight in shocking his audience. To the South he
spoke of hanging rebels, to Lincoln he advocated wholesale
shooting of deserters, and to a rival lawyer he supposedly re124 Marshall, V, 516-518.
125 James Harrison Wilson, The Life of Oharles Dana, 2 vols.. (New York.
1907), II, 483.
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marked it was better to confiscate a fortune than to marry it. 126
Actually he did none of these, but all have become part of
the Butler legend. This legend helped to win him enemies
and to magnify his faults.
When stripped of their more dramatic overtones Butler's
weaknesses were those of the typical Northern politician, businessman, and anlateur soldier. In the field he was by no
means a blundering incompetent; his record was average in
the far from spectacular list of Union generals. On the purely
tactical level his political career was carried forward by the
same methods as those of other C'Ongressmen and lawyers.
His willingness to accept contraband trade and the spoils system as. necessary and even desirable facts of life was common
to political and business circles throughout the North. Although
he had his full share of the failings of "The Gilded Age," Butler did possess a robust enthusiasm for new and unpopular
causes which often put him well ahead of his contemporaries.
His originality and grasp of the higher strategies of war and
legislation contributed to his success as an administrator and
politician. These successes made substantial contribution to
the preservation of the Union and the advancement of social
justice.
126 Butler's Book, 579-580, 538-41, 379-82 ; Hoar, I, 343-4.
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BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BUTLER was born in Deerfield,
New Hampshire, in 1818, the son of a captain in the War of
1812, who became a merchant trader, voyaging to th'e West
Indies and South America, and dying of yellow fever at St.
Kitts, before any of his three children had reached their teens.
The impoverished mother moved her family to Lowell, where
she kept a boardinghouse and received help from the parish olf
the Reverend Enoch Freeman's Baptist church. Both Freeman
and Mrs. Butler hoped that Ben would become a minister.
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